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ABSTRACT
Recent research demonstrated that the superficially well-trained
machine learning (ML) models are highly vulnerable to adversarial
examples. AsML techniques are rapidly employed in cyber-physical
systems (CPSs), the security of these applications is of concern.
However, current studies on adversarial machine learning (AML)
mainly focus on computer vision and related fields. The risks the
adversarial examples can bring to the CPS applications have not
been well investigated. In particular, due to the distributed prop-
erty of data sources and the inherent physical constraints imposed
by CPSs, the widely-used threat models in previous research and
the state-of-the-art AML algorithms are no longer practical when
applied to CPS applications.
We study the vulnerabilities of ML applied in CPSs by proposing
Constrained Adversarial Machine Learning (ConAML), which gen-
erates adversarial examples used as ML model input that meet the
intrinsic constraints of the physical systems. We first summarize
the difference between AML in CPSs and AML in existing cyber
systems and propose a general threat model for ConAML. We then
design a best-effort search algorithm to iteratively generate ad-
versarial examples with linear physical constraints. We evaluate
the vulnerabilities of ML models used in the electric power grids
and water treatment systems. The results show that our ConAML
algorithms can effectively generate adversarial examples which sig-
nificantly decrease the performance of the ML models even under
practical constraints.
KEYWORDS
adversarial machine learning; cyber-physical system; intrusion de-
tection
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) has shown promising performance in many
real-world applications, such as image classification [19], speech
recognition [17], and malware detection [54]. In recent years, moti-
vated by the promotion of cutting-edge communication and com-
putational technologies, there is a trend to adopt ML in various
cyber-physical system (CPS) applications. An example is traffic fore-
casting in the transportation system. Most forecasting approaches
in the past were simple time series models based on historical data
and these models tend to perform poorly in the face of major in-
cidents, construction activities, and significant weather events. In
recent years, machine learning is becoming increasingly common
for the forecast of traffic flow, traffic speed, congestion and queue
location, and the duration of queuing [41]. Other ML applications
in CPSs include data center thermal management [30], agriculture
ecosystem management [9], power grid attack detection [39], and
industrial control system anomaly detection [24].
Figure 1: A CPS example (power grids).
However, recent research has demonstrated that the superficially
well-trained ML models are highly vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples [16]. In particular, adversarial machine learning (AML) tech-
nologies enable attackers to deceive ML models with well-crafted
adversarial examples by adding small perturbations to legitimate
inputs. As CPSs have become synonymous to security-critical in-
frastructures such as the power grid, nuclear systems, avionics,
and transportation systems, such vulnerabilities can be exploited
leading to devastating consequences.
AML research has received considerable attention in artificial
intelligence (AI) communities and it mainly focuses on compu-
tational applications such as computer vision. However, it is not
applicable to CPSs because the inherent properties of CPSs render
the widely-used threat models and AML algorithms in previous
research infeasible. In general, the existing AML research makes
common assumptions on the attacker’s knowledge and the adver-
sarial examples. The attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of
the ML inputs and these features are assumed to be mutually inde-
pendent. For example, in computer vision AML [16], the attacker
is assumed to be able to know all the values of pixels of an image
and there is no strict dependency among the pixels. However, this
is not realistic for attacks targeting CPSs. CPSs are usually large
and complex systems whose data sources are heterogeneous and
geographically distributed. The attacker may compromise a subset
of sensors and modify their measurement data. Generally, for the
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uncompromised data sources, the attacker cannot even know the
measurements, let alone making modifications. Furthermore, for
robustness and resilience reasons, CPSs usually employ redundant
data sources and incorporate faulty data detection mechanisms. For
example, in the power grid, redundant phasor measurement units
(PMUs) are deployed in the field to measure frequency and phase
angle, and residue-based bad data detection is employed to detect
and recover from faulty data for state estimation [49]. Therefore, the
features of ML applications in CPS are not only dependent but also
subject to the physical constraints of the system. A simple example
of constraints is shown in Figure 1. All three meters are measur-
ing the electric current (Ampere) data. If an attacker compromises
Meter1, Meter2, and Meter3, no matter what modification the at-
tacker makes to the measurements, the compromised measurement
of Meter1 should always be the sum of that of Meter2 and Meter3
due to Kirchhoff’s laws. Otherwise, the crafted measurements will
be detected by the bad data detection mechanism and obviously
anomalous to the power system operators. In addition to distributed
data sources and physical constraints, sensors in real-world CPSs
are generally configured to collect data with a specific sampling
rate. A valid adversarial attack needs to be finished within the CPS’
sampling period.
The intrinsic properties of CPS pose stringent requirements for
the attackers. The attacker is now required to overcome:
• Knowledge constraint: No access to the ML models and
the measurement values of uncompromised sensors.
• Physical constraint: The crafted adversarial examples
need to meet the physical constraints defined by the sys-
tem.
• Time constraint: Attacks needs to be completed within
a sample period.
to launch an effective attack that deceives the ML applications
deployed in CPSs. However, in this paper, we show that the ML
applications in CPSs are susceptible to handcrafted adversarial
examples even though such systems naturally pose a greater barrier
for the attacker.
In this paper, we propose constrained adversarial machine learn-
ing (ConAML), a general AML framework that incorporates the
above constraints of CPSs. We firstly design a universal adversarial
measurement algorithm to solve the knowledge constraint. After
that, without loss of generality, we present a practical best-effort
search algorithm to effectively generate adversarial examples un-
der linear physical constraints which are one of the most common
constraints in real-world CPS applications. Meanwhile, we set the
maximum iteration number to control the time cost of the attack.
We implement our algorithms with ML models used in two CPSs
and mainly focus on neural networks due to its transferability. Our
main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We highlight the potential vulnerability of ML applications
in CPSs, analyze the different requirements for AML ap-
plied in CPSs with regard to the general computational
applications, and present a practical threat model for AML
in CPSs.
• We formulate the mathematical model of ConAML by in-
corporating the physical constraints of the underlying sys-
tem. To the best of our knowledge, this is also the first work
that investigates the physical mutual dependency among
the ML features in AML research.
• We proposed ConAML, an AML framework that contains
a series of AML algorithms to solve the corresponding
constraints.
• We assess our algorithms applied to the ML-empowered de-
tection of false data injection attacks in the power grid and
anomaly detection in a water treatment system. The evalu-
ation results show that the adversarial examples generated
by our algorithms can achieve notable performance.
Related research is discussed in Section 2. We analyze the prop-
erties of AML in CPSs and give the mathematical definition and
the threat model in Section 3. Section 4 presents the algorithm
design. Section 5 uses two CPSs as proofs of concept to carry our
experiments. Extensions and future work are given in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
AML is a technology that enables attackers to deceive ML models
with well-crafted adversarial examples. AML was discovered by
Szegedy et al. [44] in 2013. They found that a deep neural network
used for image classification can be easily fooled by adding a certain,
hardly perceptible perturbation to the legitimate input. Moreover,
the same perturbation can cause a different network to misclassify
the same input even when the network has a different structure
and is trained with a different dataset, which is referred to as the
transferability property of adversarial examples in the following
research. After that, in 2015, Goodfellow et al. [16] proposed the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), an efficient algorithm to generate
adversarial examples. Thereafter, several variants of FGSM were
proposed. The Fast Gradient Value (FGV)method proposed by Rozsa
et al. [42] is a simple variant of FGSM, in which the authors utilize
the raw gradient instead of the sign. In 2016, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.
presented DeepFool which searches for the closest distance between
the original input to the decision boundary in high dimensional data
space and iteratively builds the adversarial examples [36]. DeepFool
can be adapted to binary or multi-class classification tasks and
generate smaller perturbations compared with FGSM. According to
[26], single-step attack methods have better transferability but can
be easily defended. Therefore, multi-steps methods, such as iterative
methods [26] and momentum-based methods [10], are presented to
enhance the effectiveness of attacks. The above methods generate
individual adversarial examples for each legitmate inputs. In 2017,
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. designed universal adversarial perturbations
to generate perturbations regardless of the ML model inputs [37].
In recent years, research on AML applications continues growing
rapidly. Sharif et al. generated adversarial examples to attack a state-
of-the-art face-recognition system and achieved a notable result
[43]. Grossee et al. constructed an effective attack that generated
adversarial examples against Android malware detection models
[18]. In 2017, Jia et al. evaluated the robustness of neural language
processing model using the Standford Question Answering Dataset
(SQuAD) by adding adversarially inserted sentences, and the result
showed that the adversarial sentences could reduce the F1 score
from an average of 75% to 36% across sixteen published models
[23]. The adversarial attacks that target real-world applications also
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increase. In 2014, Laskov et al. developed a taxonomy for practical
adversarial attacks based on the attackers’ capability and launched
evasion attacks to PDFRATE, a real-world online machine learning
system to detect malicious PDF malware [28]. Followed by Xu et al. ,
in 2016, they utilized a genetic programming algorithm to generate
evasion adversarial examples to evaluate the robustness of ML
classifiers [50]. Their methods were evaluated with PDFRATE and
Hidost, another PDF malware classifier. In 2018, Li et al. presented
TEXTBUGGER, a framework to effectively generate adversarial text
against deep learning-based text understanding (DLTU) systems
and achieved state-of-the-art attack performance [29].
In addition to pure computation and cyberspace attacks, AML
techniques that involve the physical domain are drawing more
and more attention. Kurakin et al. presented that ML models are
still vulnerable to adversarial examples in physical world scenarios
by feeding a phone camera captured adversarial image to an Ima-
geNet classifier [25]. In 2016, Carlini et al. presented hidden voice
commands and demonstrated that well-crafted voice commands
which are unintelligible to human listeners, can be interpreted as
commands by voice controllable systems [5]. [46] and [34] investi-
gated the security of machine learning models used in autonomous
driving cars. In 2018, [14] showed that an attacker can generate
adversarial examples by modifying a portion of measurements in
CPSs, and presented an anomaly detection model where each sen-
sor’s reading is predicted as a function of other sensors’ readings.
Their threat model still allowed the attacker to know all the mea-
surements (inputs) and did not consider the constraints among
CPS measurements. After that, Erba et al. also studied the AML
in CPS and consider the physical constraints [11]. They employed
an autoencoder that trained on normal system data to reconstruct
the bad inputs to match the physical behavior. However, similar
to [14], the methods in [11] allows the attacker to know all the
measurements and the generated adversarial examples may still
violate the physical constraints.
More related work on adversarial examples, including the gener-
ation algorithms and related applications, can be found in [53].
3 SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
3.1 ML-Assisted CPSs
Generally, a CPS can be simplified as a system that consists of four
parts, namely sensors, actuators, the communication network, and
the control center [7], as shown in Figure 2. The sensors measure
and quantify the data from the physical environment, and send the
measurement data to the control center through the communication
network. In practice, the raw measurement data will be filtered
and processed by the gateway according to the error checking
mechanism whose rules are defined by human experts based on the
properties of the physical system. Measurement data that violates
the physically defined rules will be removed.
Similar to [11], we consider the scenario that the control center
utilizes ML model(s) to make decisions (classification) based on the
filtered measurement data from the gateway directly, and the fea-
tures used to train the ML models are the measurements of sensors
respectively. The goal of the attacker will be leading the CPS appli-
cations with ML model(s) to output wrong (classification) results
Figure 2: Machine learning-assisted CPS architecture.
without being detected by the gateway by adding perturbations to
the measurements of the compromised sensors.
3.2 Threat Model
Adversarial attacks can be classified according to the attacker’s
capability and attack goals [6, 28, 53]. In this work, we consider
the integrity attack that the attacker generates adversarial pertur-
bations to the ML inputs to deceive the ML model to make wrong
classification outputs.
Different from the traditional computational applications, there
are several inherent properties of CPS that pose specific require-
ments for a ConAML attacker. First, in CPS, ML models are usually
placed in the control centers, market operators, and other central-
ized locations which employ comprehensive and advanced security
measures such as air-gapped networks. It is highly unlikely for
the attacker to have access to the models and a black-box attack
should be considered. Second, we assume that the attacker cannot
access the training dataset for the same reason as above, but has
access to an alternative dataset such as historical data that follows a
similar distribution to train their models. It is not difficult to obtain
historical data, for instance, temperature data for load forecasting,
earthquake sensor data, flood water flow data, and traffic flow data,
since these data are usually published or shared among multiple
parties.
To launch adversarial attacks, the attacker is assumed to be
able to compromise a certain number of sensors, and can freely
eavesdrop and modify their measurement data. These sensors are
deployed in the wild and their security is hard to guarantee. In
real attack scenarios, this can be implemented by either directly
compromising the sensors, such as device intrusion or attacking
the communication network, such as man-in-the-middle attacks.
However, due to the vastly distributed nature of sensors in CPS, it
is only reasonable for the attacker to compromise a subset of the
3
data sources but not all of them. For the uncompromised sensors,
the attacker can neither know their measurement values nor make
modifications. This constraint indicates that the attacker has limited
knowledge of the ML inputs.
Figure 3: A CPS example (water pipelines).
Meanwhile, the attacker is further assumed to generate adversar-
ial examples that meet the constraints imposed by the physical laws
and system topology and evade any built-in detection mechanisms
in the system. Specifically, since they are very common in real-
world CPSs, we will mainly focus on linear constraints in this paper,
including both linear equality constraints and linear inequality con-
straints. An example of the linear inequality constraint is shown in
Figure 3. All the meters in Figure 3 are measuring water flow which
follows the arrows’ direction. If an attacker wants to defraud the
anomaly detection ML model of a water treatment system by modi-
fying the meters’ readings, the adversarial measurement of Meter1
should always be larger than the sum of Meter2 and Meter3 due
to the physical structure of the pipelines. Otherwise, the poisoned
inputs will be obviously anomalous to the victim (system operator)
and detected automatically by the error checking mechanisms. In
practice, many of the constraints can be explicitly abstracted from
the measurement data. On the other hand, there are constraints that
may not be evident from the data. Such constraints may be encoded
within system applications, e.g., contingency analysis based on state
estimation in the power grid. However, these constraints can be
accessed by insider attackers such as system operators, engineers
working with the application, and software vendors. We discuss
the nonlinear equality constraints at Section 6.
Last but not least, the real-world CPSs, such as the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), will have a constant mea-
surement sampling rate (frequency) configured for their sensors.
The attacker who targets CPSs’ ML applications is then required to
generate a valid adversarial example within a measurement sam-
pling period.
We summarize the threat model as follows:
• We assume the attacker has no access to the system oper-
ator’s trained model in the control center, including the
hyper-parameters and the related dataset. However, the
attacker has an alternative dataset as an approximation of
the defender’s (system operator’s) training dataset to train
his/her ML models.
• The attacker will be able to compromise a subset of sensors
in the CPS and make modifications to their measurement
data. However, the attack can neither know nor modify
the measurements of uncompromised sensors.
• The attacker knows the linear constraints of the measure-
ments imposed by the physical system.
3.3 Physical Constraint Mathematical
Representation
In this subsection, we present the mathematical definition of the
physical linear constraints of the ML inputs and represent the AML
as a constrained optimization problem.
3.3.1 Notations. In order to simplify the mathematical rep-
resentation, we will use AB =
[
ab0 ,ab1 , ...,abn−1
]
to denote a
sampled vector of A = [a0,a1, ...,am−1] according to B, where
B = [b0,b1, ...,bn−1] is a vector of sampling index. For example, if
A = [a,b, c,d, e] and B = [0, 2, 4], we have AB = [a, c, e].
We assume there are totally d sensors in a CPS, and each sen-
sor’s measurement is a feature of the ML model fθ in the control
center. We use S = [s0, s1, ..., sd−1]T and M = [m0,m1, ...,md−1]T
to denote all the sensors and their measurements respectively. The
attacker compromised r sensors in the CPS andC = [c0, c1, ..., cr−1]
denotes the index vector of the compromised sensors. Obviously, we
have ∥C∥ = r and 0 < r ≤ d . Meanwhile, the uncompromised sen-
sors’ indexes are denoted asU = [u0,u1, ...,ud−r−1] (∥U ∥ = d − r ).
∆ = [δ0,δ1, ...,δd−1]T is the adversarial perturbation to be added
toM . However, the attacker can only inject∆C =
[
δc0 ,δc1 , ...,δcr−1
]T
to MC . The polluted adversarial measurements become M∗C =
MC +∆C , andm∗ci =mci +δci (0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1). Apparently, we have
δi = δc j when i = c j , i ∈ C , and δi = 0 when i < C . Similarly, the
crafted adversarial example M∗ =
[
m∗0,m
∗
1, ...,m
∗
d−1
]
= M + ∆ is
feed into fθ . We havem∗i = m
∗
c j when i = c j , i ∈ C andm∗i = mi
when i < C . All the notations are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: List of Notations
Symbol Description
fθ The trained model with hyperparameter θ
S The vector of sensors
M The vector of measurements of S
∆ The perturbations vector added toM
M∗ The sum of ∆ andM . The vector of
compromised input
C The vector of the indexes of compromised
sensors or measurements
U The vector of the indexes of uncompromised
sensors or measurements
Y The original class of the measurementM
Y ′ The target class of the measurementM∗
Φ The linear constraint matrix
3.3.2 Mathematical Presentation. For linear equality con-
straints (such as the current measurements (Amperes) of the three
meters in Figure 1), we suppose there are k constraints of the com-
promised measurementsMC that the attacker needs to meet, and
the k constraints can be represented as follow:
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
ϕ0,0 ·mc0 + ... + ϕ0,r−1 ·mcr−1 = ϕ0,r
ϕ1,0 ·mc0 + ... + ϕ1,r−1 ·mcr−1 = ϕ1,r
...
ϕk−1,0 ·mc0 + ... + ϕk−1,r−1 ·mcr−1 = ϕk−1,r
(1)
The above constraints can be represented as (2). We have Φk×r =
[Φ0,Φ1, ...,Φk−1]T , where Φi =
[
ϕi,0,ϕi,1, ...,ϕi,r−1
] (0 ≤ i ≤
k − 1), Φi, j = ϕi, j (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1) and Φ˜ =[
ϕ0,r ,ϕ1,r , ...,ϕk−1,r
]T .
Φk×rMC = Φ˜ (2)
To deceive the model f to make false classification, the attacker
needs to generate the perturbation vector ∆C and adds it to MC
such that f will predict the different output. Meanwhile, the crafted
measurementsM∗C = ∆C +MC should also meet the constraints in
(2) to avoid being noticed by the system operator or detected by
the error checking mechanism.
Formally, the attacker who launches AML attacks needs to solve
the following optimization problem:
max
∆C
L(fθ (M∗),Y ) (3a)
s .t . M∗C = MC + ∆C (3b)
Φk×rMC = Φ˜ (3c)
Φk×rM∗C = Φ˜ (3d)
M∗ = M + ∆ (3e)
∆U = 0 (3f)
where L is a loss function, and Y is the original class label of the
input vectorM .
In addition, the linear inequality constraints among the com-
promised measurements can be represented as equation (4), and the
constrained optimization problem to be solved is also similar to (2)
but replacing (2c) with Φk×rMC ≤ Φ˜ and (2d) with Φk×rM∗C ≤ Φ˜
respectively.
Φk×rMC ≤ Φ˜ (4)
4 DESIGN OF CONAML
The universal adversarial measurements algorithm is proposed in
subsection 4.1 to solve the knowledge constraint of the attacker.
Subsection 4.2 analyzes the properties of physical linear equality
constraints in AML and 4.3 presents the adversarial generation
algorithm. Subsection 4.4 shows the linear inequality constraints
can be represented by linear equality constraints.
4.1 Universal Adversarial Measurements
We first deal with the challenge of the attacker’s limited knowl-
edge on the uncompromised measurements MU . This challenge
is difficult to tackle since the complete measurement vector M is
needed to obtain the gradient values in many AML algorithms
[16, 26, 36, 37, 42] . In 2017, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. proposed the
Algorithm 1: Universal Adv-Measur Algorithm
1 Input: fθ ,MU ,MC , λ, Y ,MaxItera
2 Output:M∗
3 function uniAdvMeasur(fθ ,MU ,MC , λ,Y ,MaxItera)
4 initialize ∆ = 0
5 build setMUC =
{
MC |U0 ,MC |U1 , ...,MC |UN
}
6 set counter cycNum = 0
7 while cycNum < MaxItera do
8 set f laд to 0
9 forMC |Ui inMUC do
10 ∆ = onePerturGenAlgorithm(∆,MC |Ui )
11 if sampleEva(fθ ,Y ,MUC,∆) < λ then
12 set f laд to 1
13 break
14 end
15 end
16 if f laд equals 1 then
17 break
18 end
19 cycNum++
20 end
21 returnM∗ = M + ∆
22 end
universal adversarial perturbation scheme which generates image-
agnostic adversarial perturbation vectors [37]. The identical uni-
versal adversarial perturbation vector can cause different images to
be misclassified by the state-of-the-art ML-based image classifiers
with high probability. The basic philosophy of [37] is to iteratively
and incrementally build a perturbation vector that can misclassify
a set of images sampled from the whole dataset.
Algorithm 2: Sample Evaluation
1 Input: fθ , Y ,MUC , ∆
2 Output: Classification Accuracy
3 function sampleEva(fθ ,Y ,MUC,∆)
4 add perturbation ∆ to all vectors inMUC
5 evaluateMUC with fθ and label Y
6 return the classification accuracy of fθ (MUC)
7 end
Inspired by their approach, we now present our universal adver-
sarial measurements algorithm. We define an ordered set of N sam-
pled uncompromised measurementsMU =
{
MU0 ,MU1 , ...,MUN
}
,
and use MC |Ui to denote the crafted measurement vector from
MC and the sampled uncompromised measurement vector MUi .
Here, MC |Ui is a crafted measurement vector with
MC |Ui  = d .
The uncompromised measurement vectors inMU can be randomly
selected from the attacker’s alternative dataset.
Algorithm 1 describes a high-level approach to generate adver-
sarial perturbations regardless of uncompromised measurements.
The algorithm first builds a set of crafted measurement vectorMUC
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based onMU andMC , and then starts an iteration overMUC . The
iteration process is limited toMaxItera times to control the maxi-
mum time cost. The purpose is to find a universal ∆ that can cause
a portion of the vectors inMUC misclassified by fθ . The function
sampleEva described in Algorithm 2 evaluatesMUC and Y with
the ML model fθ and returns the classification accuracy. λ ∈ (0, 1]
is a constant chosen by the attacker to determine the attack suc-
cess rate inMUC according to ∆. During each searching iteration,
algorithm 1 builds and maintains the perturbation ∆ increasingly
using an adversarial perturbation generation algorithms, as shown
by Line 10 in Algorithm 1. We will propose our methods to handle
this problem in the next subsections.
Figure 4: Iteration illustration.
Figure 4 presents a simple illustration of the iteration process
in Algorithm 1. We have three sensors M = [m0,m1,m2] with
m0 = α compromised by the attacker. The yellow, green and or-
ange shallow areas in the plane M0 = α represent the possible
adversarial examples of the crafted measurement vector MC |U0 ,
MC |U1 , and MC |U2 , respectively. The initial point M (red⋆) iter-
ates twice (r0 and r1) and finally reaches M∗ with the universal
perturbation vector ∆. Therefore,M∗ is a valid adversarial example
for allMC |Ui (i ∈ {0, 1, 2}).
Comparison of Methods: Our approach is different from [37]
in several aspects. First, the approach proposed in [37] has iden-
tical adversarial perturbations for different ML inputs while our
approach actually generates distinct perturbations for eachM . Sec-
ond, the approach in [37] builds universal perturbations regardless
of the real-time ML inputs. However, as the attacker has already
compromised a portion of measurements, it is more effective to
take advantage of the obtained knowledge. In other words, our
perturbations are ‘universal’ forMU but ‘distinct’ forM . Finally,
the intrinsic properties of CPSs require the attacker to generate a
valid adversarial example within a sampling period while there is
no enforced limitation of the iteration time in [37].
4.2 Linear Equality Constraints Analysis
As shown in [16] and [42], the fundamental philosophy of AML
can be represented as (5).
M∗ = M + ∆ = M + ϵ∇ML(fθ (M),Y ) (5)
However, directly following the gradient will not guarantee the
adversarial examples meet the constraints in (2) and (4). With the
constraints imposed by the physical system, the attacker is no
longer able to freely add perturbation to original input using the
raw gradient of the input vector. In this subsection, we will analyze
how the linear equality constraints will affect the way to generate
perturbation and use a simple example for illustration.
Under the threat model proposed in Section 3.2, the constraint
of (3c) is always met due to the properties of the physical systems.
We then consider the constraint (3d).
Theorem 4.1. The sufficient and necessary condition to meet con-
straint (3d) is Φk×r∆C = 0.
Proof. If we replace M∗C in equation (3d) with equation (3b),
we can get Φk×rM∗C = Φk×r (MC +∆C ) = Φk×rMC +Φk×r∆C = Φ˜.
From equation (3c) we can learn that Φk×rMC = Φ˜. Therefore, we
have Φk×r∆C = 0 and prove Theorem 4.1. □
From Theorem 4.1 we can also derive a very useful corollary, as
shown below.
Corollary 4.2. If ∆C0 , ∆C1 , ..., ∆Cn are valid perturbation vectors
that follow the constraints, then we have ∆C ′ =
∑n
i=0 ai · ∆Ci is also
a valid perturbation for the constraint Φk×r .
Proof. We have Φk×r∆C ′ = Φk×r
∑n
i=0 ai · ∆Ci =
∑n
i=0 ai ·
Φk×r∆Ci . Since ∆Ci is a valid perturbation vector and Φ∆Ci = 0,
we have Φk×r∆C ′ = 0 and prove Corollary 4.2. □
Theorem 4.1 indicates that the perturbation vector to be added to
the original measurements must be a solution of the homogeneous
linear equations Φk×rX = 0. However, is this condition always
met? We present Theorem 4.3 to answer this question, and the
proof can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.3. In practical scenarios, the attacker can always find a
valid solution (perturbation) that meets the linear equality constraints
imposed by the physical systems.
We utilize a simplified example to illustrate how the constraints
will affect the generation of perturbations, as shown in Figure 5.
According to 5, measurementM should move a small step (pertur-
bation) to the gradient direction (direction 1 in Figure 5) to increase
the loss most rapidly. However, as shown by the contour lines in
Figure 5, the measurementM is always forced to be on the straight
line y = 2 − 2x , which is the projection of the intersection of the
two surfaces. Accordingly, instead of following the raw gradient,M
should move forward to direction 2 to increase the loss. Therefore,
although at a relatively slow rate, it is still possible for the attacker
to increase the loss under the constraints.
4.3 Adversarial Example Generation under
Linear Equality Constraint
The common method of solving optimization problems using gradi-
ent descent under constraints is projected gradient descent (PGD).
However, since neural networks are generally not considered as
convex functions [8], PGD cannot be used to generate adversarial
6
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Figure 5: Linear equality constraint illustration.We consider
a simple ML model f that only has two dimensions inputs
(x ,y) with a loss function L(fθ (M),Y ) = z(x ,y) = 2x2 + 2y2.
Meanwhile, we suppose the input measurements x and y
need tomeet the linear constraints 2x+y = 2 and the current
measurement vectorM = (0.4, 1.2).
examples directly. We propose the design of a simple but effec-
tive search algorithm to generate the adversarial examples under
physical linear equality constraints.
As discussed in subsection 4.2, the perturbation ∆C needs to be a
solution of Φk×rX = 0. We use n = Rank(Φk×r ) to denote the rank
of the matrix Φk×r , where 0 < n < r . It is obvious that the solution
set of homogeneous linear equation Φk×rX = 0will have r −n basic
solution vectors. We use I = [i0, i1, ..., ir−n−1]T to denote the index
of independent variables in the solution set, D = [d0,d1, ...,dn−1]T
to denote the index of corresponding dependent variables, and
Bn×(r−n) to denote the linear dependency matrix of XI and XD .
Clearly, we have XDn×1 = Bn×(r−n)XI(r−n)×1 . An example of gener-
ating XI , XD and Bn×(r−n) can be found in Appendix B. For con-
venience, we will use [I ,D,B] = dependency(Φk×r ) to describe
the process of getting I , D, B from matrix Φk×r .
As shown in Algorithm 3, the function genEqPer takes ∆ as
an input and outputs a valid perturbation v for M . Algorithm 3
keeps executing eqOneStep for multiple times defined by step
to generate a valid v increasingly. Function eqOneStep performs
a single-step attack for the input vector and returns a one-step
perturbation r that matches the constraints defined by Φ, which is
shown in Algorithm 4. Due to Corollary 4.2, ∆ andv will also follow
the constraints. To decrease the iteration time, similar to [36], the
algorithm will return the crafted adversarial examples immediately
as long as f ′θ ′ misclassifies the input measurement vectorM +v , as
shown by Line 7 in Algorithm 3.
The philosophy of function eqOneStep in algorithm 4 is very
straightforward. From the constraint Matrix Φ, we can get the
independent variables I , dependent variablesD and the dependency
matrix B between them. We will simply keep the gradient values of
I and use them to compute the corresponding values of D (Line 7)
so that the final output perturbation r will follow Φ. The constant
Algorithm 3: Best-Effort Search (Linear Equality)
1 Input: ∆, fθ , C ,M , step, size , Φ, Y
2 Output: v
3 function genEqPer(∆, fθ ,C,M, step, size,Φ,Y )
4 initialize v = ∆
5 initialize stepNum = 0
6 while stepNum ≤ step − 1 do
7 if f ′θ ′(M +v) doesn’t equals Y then
8 return v
9 end
10 r = eqOneStep(fθ ,C,M +v, size,Φ,Y )
11 update v = v + r
12 stepNum = stepNum + 1
13 end
14 return v
15 end
Algorithm 4: One Step Attack Constraint ∆C
1 Input: fθ , C ,M , size , Φ, Y
2 Output: r
3 function eqOneStep(fθ ,C,M, size,Φk×r ,Y )
4 calculate gradient vector G = ∇ML(fθ (M),Y )
5 set all elements of GU in G to zero
6 define G ′ = GC
7 obtain tuple [I ,D,B] = dependency(Φk×r )
8 update G ′D = BG
′
I in G
′
9 ϵ = size/max(abs(G ′))
10 return r = ϵG
11 end
factor size defines the largest modification the attacker can make
to a specific measurement to control the search speed.
4.4 Adversarial Example Generation under
Linear Inequality Constraint
Algorithm 5: Non-Constraint Perturbation.
1 Input: f ′θ ′ ,U ,M , size , Y
2 Output: r
3 function freeStep(f ′θ ′ ,U ,M, size,Y )
4 calculate gradient vector G = ∇ML(f ′θ ′(M),Y )
5 set elements in GU to zero
6 ϵ = size/max(abs(G))
7 return r = ϵG
8 end
Linear inequality constraints are very in real-world CPS appli-
cations, like the water flow constraints in Figure 3. Due to mea-
surement noise, real-world systems usually tolerate distinctions
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between measurements and expectation values as long as the dis-
tinctions are smaller than predefined thresholds, which also brings
inequality constraints to data. Meanwhile, a linear equality con-
straint can be represented by two linear inequality constraints. As
shown in equation (4), linear inequality constraints define the valid
measurement subspace whose boundary hyper-planes are defined
by equation (2). In general, the search process under linear inequal-
ity constraints can be categorized into two situations. The first
situation is when a point (measurement vector) is in the subspace
and meets all constraints, while the second situation happens when
the point reaches boundaries.
Algorithm 6: Best-Effort Search (Linear Inequality)
1 Input: ∆, f ′θ ′ , C ,U ,M , step, size , Φ, Φ˜, Y
2 Output: v
3 function genIqPer(∆, f ′θ ′ ,C,U ,M, step, size,Φ, Φ˜,Y )
4 initialize pioneer = ∆, valid = pioneer
5 initialize stepNum = 0
6 initialize V as empty // violated constrain index
7 while stepNum ≤ step − 1 do
8 if f ′θ ′(M +valid) doesn’t equals Y then
9 break
10 end
11 chkRst = chkIq(Φ, Φ˜,M + pioneer ,C)
12 if chkRst is empty then
13 valid = pioneer
14 r = freeStep(f ′θ ′ ,U ,M +valid, size,Y )
15 pioneer = valid + r
16 reset V to empty
17 else
18 extend V with chkRst
19 define Φ′ = ΦV // real-time constraints
20 r = eqOneStep(f ′θ ′ ,C,M +valid, size,Φ′,Y )
21 pioneer = valid + r
22 end
23 stepNum = stepNum + 1
24 end
25 return v = valid
26 end
Due to the property of physical systems, the original point M
will naturally meet all the constraints. As shown in Algorithm 6,
to increase the loss, the original point will first try to move a step
following the gradient direction through the function freeStep
defined in Algorithm 5. Algorithm 5 is very similar to the FGM
algorithm [42] but no perturbation is added toMU , namely rU = 0,
which is similar to the saliency map function used in [40]. After that,
the new pointM ′ is checkedwith equation (4) to find if all inequality
constraints are met. If all constraints were met, the moved step was
valid and we can updateM = M ′. IfM ′ violates some constraints
in Φ, we will take all the violated constraints and make a real-
time constraint matrix ΦV , where V is the index vector of violated
constraints. We now convert the inequality constraint problem to
the equality constraint problem with the new constraint matrix
ΦV and the original pointM .M will then try to take a step using
the eqOneStep function described in Algorithm 4 with the new
constraint matrix ΦV . Again, we check whether the new reached
point meets all the constraints. If there are still violated constraints,
we extend V with the new violated constraints. The search process
repeats until reaching a validM ′ that meets all the constraints. For
simplicity, we will use chkRst = chkIq(Φ, Φ˜,M ′,C) to denote the
checking process of a single search in one step movement, where
chkRst is the index vector of the violated constraints in the search.
Similar to Figure 5, a simple example is shown in Figure 6. To
increase the loss, the initial point a will take a small step following
the gradient direction and reach point b. Since b meets the con-
straints, it is a valid point. After that, b will move a step following
the gradient direction and reach point c ′. However, point c ′ violates
the constraint β and the movement is not valid. As we have point
b is valid, we construct a linear equality constraint problem with
constraint α which is parallel to β . With constraint α , point b will
move a step to point c which is also a valid point. Point c then
repeats the search process and increases the loss gradually. The
real-time equality constraint is only used once. When a new valid
point is reached, it empties the previous equality constraints and
tries the gradient direction first.
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Figure 6: Best-Effort Search (linear inequality). We have the
loss function L(fθ (M),Y ) = 2x2 + 2y2 with inequality con-
straints y ≤ 2 − 2x .
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our ConAML frameworks with two
CPS study cases. The first study case is the ML-based false data
injection attack (FDIA) detection in the power grids to demonstrate
the impact of physical linear equality constraints, and the second
case is the anomaly detection in the water treatment system to
demonstrate linear inequality constraints. For each CPS study, we
consider four attack scenarios regarded to the different knowledge
constraints, as summarized in Table 2. The black-box scenario is
the knowledge constraint we presented in our threat model in
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subsection 3.2.We consider different scenarios to show the impact of
different constraints and to study the robustness of ML applications
in CPSs under different circumstances. It is worth to note that
attackers under all the scenarios in Table 2 can only modify MC
and should also follow the physical and time constraints.
Table 2: Attack Scenarios
Scenario Constraint
white-box know bothMC andMU , has access to fθ
gray-box1 know bothMC andMU , no access to fθ
gray-box2 only knowMC , has access to fθ
black-box only knowMC , no access to fθ
In addition to the above scenarios, we also set two evaluation
baselines. The first baseline considers a supreme attacker who has
full access to the CPSMLmodel without considering any constraints
and utilizes the methods proposed in [42] to generate adversarial
examples. We compare the performance of the ConAML frame-
work with the supreme attack to demonstrate the impact of the
constraints. The second baseline the autoencoder generator pro-
posed in [11] proposed by Erba et al. in 2019. In [11], an autoencoder
is trained with the normal CPS measurement data and is expected
to learn the physical constraints of measurements. The adversarial
examples in [11] are fed to the autoencoder to be transferred into
examples that meet the physical constraints. However, the autoen-
coder generator approach allows the attacker to know completeM
(same as the gray-box1 scenario in Table 2) and we will show that
the generated examples from the autoencoder may still violate the
physical constraints.
The evaluation metrics of AML in CPS can be different according
to the attack purpose and the properties of CPSs. In this section,
we select three metrics to evaluate the performance of the attack.
The first metric will be the detection accuracy of the defender’s
ML model under attack (in percentage). The second metric is the
magnitude of the noise injected to the legitimate measurement. The
attacker will need the adversarial examples to bypass the detection
while maintaining their malicious behavior. A small bad noise will
violate the attack’s original intention even if it can bypass the
detection. We select the L2-Norm of the valid noise vector as the
second metric to compare the magnitude of the malicious injected
data. Finally, as the attack needs to be finished within a sampling
period of the CPS, we will compare the time cost of the adversarial
example generation.
5.1 Case Study: Power Grids
5.1.1 Background: State Estimation and FDIA. Power grids are
critical infrastructures that connect power generation to end cus-
tomers through transmission and distribution grids. In recent decades,
the rapid development of technologies in sensors, communication,
and computing enables various applications in the power grid. How-
ever, as the power system becomes more complex and dependent
on the information and communications technology, the threat of
cyber-attacks also increases, and the cyber-power system becomes
more vulnerable [45, 47]. The cyberattack to the Ukraine power
grid in 2015 is a well-known example [31].
z = Hx + e (6)
State estimation is a backbone of various crucial applications in
power system control that has been enabled by large scale sens-
ing and communication technologies, such as supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA). Generally speaking, the state esti-
mation is used to estimate the state of each bus, such as voltage
angles and magnitudes, in the power grid through analyzing other
measurements. A DC model of state estimation can be represented
as (6), where z is the state, x is the measurement, and Hm×n is a
matrix that determined by the topology, physical parameters and
configurations of the power grid. Due to possible meter instability
and cyber attacks, bad measurements e may be introduced to z.
To solve this, the power system employs a linear residual-based
detection scheme to remove the error measurements [35]. However,
in 2009, Liu et al. proposed the false data injection attack (FDIA)
that can bypass the residual-based detection scheme and finally
pollute the result of state estimation [32]. In particular, if the at-
tacker knowsH, she/he could construct a faulty vector a that meets
the linear constraint Ba = 0, where B = H(HTH)−1HT − I, and
the crafted faulty measurements x + a will not be detected by the
system. A detailed introduction of state estimation, residual-based
error detection, and FDIA can be found in Appendix C.1
Figure 7: IEEE 39-Bus System [2]
As FDIA presented a serious threat to the power grid security,
many detection and mitigation schemes to defend FDIA are pro-
posed, including strategical measurement protection [4] and PMU-
based protection [52]. In recent years, detection schemes based on
ML, especially neural networks, have been proposed and become
popular [3, 20, 22, 38, 39, 48, 51]. The ML-based do not require ex-
tra hardware equipment and achieve the state-of-the-art detection
performance. However, in this section, we will demonstrate that
ML approaches are vulnerable to ConAML. With the well-crafted
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adversarial perturbations, the polluted measurements from the at-
tacker can not only pass the traditional residual-based approach
but also significantly decrease the detection accuracy of the ML
schemes.
5.1.2 Experiment Design and Evaluation. We select the IEEE
standard 10-machine 39-bus system as the power grid system as it
is one of the benchmark systems in related research. The system
has 46 branches so that there there will be 46 features for the ML
models.
In our experiment, the goal of the attacker is to implement a
false negative attack that makes the pollutedmeasurements pass the
detection of theMLmodels, namely to fool the models to misclassify
the false measurements as normal. We utilize the MATPOWER
[55] library to derive the H matrix and simulate related data. We
generate two training datasets for the system operator and the
attacker to train their ML models. Through tuning the parameters,
the overall detection accuracy of the defender’s model fθ is 98.3%
and the attacker’s model f ′θ ′ is 97.5%. After that, we assume there
are 10, 13, and 15 measurements being compromised by the attacker
and generate the corresponding test datasets respectively. A more
detailed description of the experiment can be found in Appendix
C.2.
Table 3: Evaluation Result
Attack Case Accu L2-Norm Time (ms)
Supreme
10 0% 4077.43 5.8
13 0% 8403.84 12.9
15 0% 7979.26 6.8
Erba [11]
10 0% 1049.52 5.7
13 0% 1164.71 5.84
15 0% 1578.87 5.94
white-box
10 0% 2527.8 42
13 0% 4984.03 96.8
15 0% 7029.26 52.9
gray-box1
10 21.1% 2404.76 34.2
13 48.9% 5356.09 87.1
15 30.0% 9133.15 7.96
gray-box2
10 0% 2247.21 400.25
13 5.4% 4882.95 222.4
15 8.1% 6610.6 126.9
black-box
10 14.4% 1843.2 131.9
13 4.3% 4786.72 209.6
15 28.1% 9079.02 163.3
The performance evaluations of different attacks are summarized
in Table 3. From the table, we can learn that the ConAML attacks can
effectively decrease the detection accuracy of the ML models used
for FDIA and inject considerable bad data to the power systems. The
autoencoder generator methods [11] can transfer the adversarial
examples to follow the manifolds of the normal measurements (0%
detection accuracy). However, the size of the successful bad data
is very smaller compared with the supreme attack and ConAML,
which decreases the effect of the attack. In addition, we check the
adversarial examples of the generator method and find that most of
the generated examples (over 90%) obviously violate the physical
constraints. Therefore, the examples will be detected by the state
estimation.
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Figure 8: Performance of black-box attacks according to λ
with step = 40, size = 20.
As shown in Figure 8 by comparing the evaluation results of dif-
ferent cases, we can learn that compromising more sensors cannot
guarantee better performances in attack detection. This is due to
the different physical constraints imposed by the system. However,
with more compromised sensors, the attacker can usually obtain a
larger size of the injected bad data.
The time cost of black-box attacks
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Figure 9: Time cost of black-box attacks according to λ with
step = 40, size = 20.
In our experiments, the time cost of gray-box2 and black-box is
much higher than other attack scenarios due to the universal ad-
versarial measurements algorithm, as shown in Figure 9. However,
the time cost is still efficient for many CPS applications in practice.
For example, the sampling period of the traditional SCADA system
used in the electrical power system is 2 to 4 seconds. In practical
scenarios, the time cost of adversarial example generation depends
on the computational resource of the attacker. With the possible
optimization and upgrade in software and hardware, the time cost
can be further reduced.
5.2 Case Study: Water Treatment System
5.2.1 Background: SWaT Dataset. In this section, we study the
linear inequality physical constraints based on the Secure Water
Treatment (SWaT) proposed in [15]. SWaT is a scaled-down system
but with fully operational water treatment functions. The testbed
has six main processes and consists of cyber control (PLCs) and
physical components of the water treatment facility. The SWaT
dataset, generated by the SWaT testbed, is a public dataset to in-
vestigate the cyber attacks on CPSs. The raw dataset has 946,722
samples with each sample comprised of 51 attributes, including the
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measurements of 25 sensors and the states of 26 actuators. Each
sample in the dataset was labeled with normal or attack. [15] inves-
tigated four kinds of attacks based on the number of attack points
and places. The detailed description of the SWaT dataset can be
found in [15] and [27].
The SWaT dataset is an important resource to study CPS security.
In 2017, Inoue et al. used unsupervised machine learning, including
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and SVM, to perform anomaly
detection based on the SWaT dataset [21]. By comparison, Kravchik
et al. employed Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and achieved
a better false positive rate [24]. In 2019, [13] proposed a data-driven
framework to derive invariant rules for anomaly detection for CPS
and utilized SWaT to evaluate their approach. Other research related
to the SWaT dataset can be found in [1, 7, 12].
Table 4: SWaT Analog Components
Symbol Description Unit
LIT Level Indication Transmitter mm
FIT Flow Indication Transmitter m3/hr
AIT Analyzer Indication Transmitter uS/cm
PIT Pressure Indication Transmitter kPa
DPIT Differential Pressure Ind Transmitter kPa
5.2.2 Experimental Design and Evaluation. As shown in Table
4, the SWaT dataset includes the measurements from five kinds
of analog components. We examined the SWaT testbed structure
and find out that there are linear inequality constraints among
the FIT measurements. We then checked the SWaT dataset and
the normal examples in the dataset verified our find. The linear
inequality constraints of the FIT measurements are defined by the
structure of the water pipelines and the placement of the sensors.
Similar to the power system study case, we generate two training
datasets for the defender’s model fθ and the attacker’s model f ′θ ′
respectively by poisoning the normal measurements with Gaussian
noise. In our experiment, the overall detection accuracy of fθ and
f ′θ ′ is 97.2% and 96.7% respectively. After that, we consider the sce-
narios that there are 2, 5, and 7 FITmeasurements compromised by
the attacker and generate the related test datasets. A more detailed
introduction of the experiments design and implementation, includ-
ing the specific compromised measurements and the corresponding
constraint matrix Φ, can be found in Appendix D.1.
Table 5 summarizes the evaluation performances of different
attacks. From the table, we can learn that the ConAML framework
can still effectively decrease the detection accuracy of the ML mod-
els, even for black-box attacks. Meanwhile, the black-box attack
achieves a better performance on both the detection accuracy and
bad data size compared with the generator approach. The size of
the injected bad data of the ConAML attacks is relatively small
compared with the supreme attacker. We explain that this is due to
the stringent constraints between the FIT measurements. Similar
to the power system study case, a larger number of compromised
sensors cannot produce a better performance in bypassing the de-
tection. The reason for this result is that more compromised sensors
will also have more complex constraints between their measure-
ments. Meanwhile, more constraints will increase the computation
Table 5: Evaluation Result
Attack Case Accu L2-Norm Time (ms)
Supreme
2 0% 3.24 3.59
5 0% 2.85 6.58
7 0% 4.31 9.21
Erba [11]
2 85.3% 0.176 4.72
5 86.1% 0.017 4.12
7 88.4% 0.184 6.18
white-box
2 0% 0.741 21.7
5 0% 0.75 24.8
7 2% 1.05 71.5
gray-box1
2 0% 0.522 21.4
5 53.2% 0.466 51.0
7 89.3% 0.835 136.4
gray-box2
2 1.0% 0.52 42.9
5 1.2% 0.627 94.2
7 1.3% 0.841 256.1
black-box
2 1.3% 0.309 17.5
5 2.3% 0.340 111.7
7 1.14% 0.411 451.8
overhead of the best effort search algorithms since there will be a
‘larger’ constraint matrix.
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Figure 10: Performance of black-box attacks according to λ
with step = 50, size = 0.06.
Figure 10 demonstrated the trend of the detection accuracy and
injected bad data size according to λ. From the figure, we can learn
that, with the λ increases, the probability of the adversarial ex-
amples being detected also increases. This matches the intuition
that if an adversarial example can obtain higher successful attack
probability with the sampling measurement set, the probability of
evading detection will also increase. Meanwhile, a smaller injected
data size is expected to make the adversarial examples look more
‘normal’ to the detection model.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Non-Linear Constraints
Many other machine learning-based applications in the CPS do-
mains, for instance, load forecasting in power and water systems,
traffic forecasting in transportation systems, have nonlinear con-
straints. The non-linear constraints can be very complex in various
CPSs and cannot be covered in one study. In general, similar to
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linear constraints, the k nonlinear constraints of the compromised
measurements can be represented as equation (7), where µi is a
nonlinear function ofMC .

µ0(mc0 ,mc1 , ...,mcr−1 ) = 0
µ1(mc0 ,mc1 , ...,mcr−1 ) = 0
...
µk−1(mc0 ,mc1 , ...,mcr−1 ) = 0
(7)
We now investigate a special case of the nonlinear constraints. If
there exists a subset of the compromised measurements, in which
each measurement can be represented as an explicit function of
the measurements in the complement set, the attacker will also
be able to generate the perturbation accordingly. We use P =
[p0,p1, ...,pn−1] to denote the index vector of the former measure-
ment set, and useQ = [q0,q1, ...,qr−n−1] to denote the index vector
of the complement set. We can then represent (7) as (8), where
Ξ = [ξ0, ξ1, ..., ξn−1] is a vector of explicit functions.

mp0 = ξ0(mq0 ,mq1 , ...,mqr−n−1 )
mp1 = ξ1(mq0 ,mq1 , ...,mqr−n−1 )
...
mpn−1 = ξn−1(mq0 ,mq1 , ...,mqr−n−1 )
(8)
Apparently, the roles ofMQ andMP in (8) are similar to theMI
andMD in linear constraints correspondingly. Instead of a linear
matrix, the function set Ξ represents the dependency between
MP and MQ . The nonlinear constraints make properties such as
Theorem 1 infeasible. To meet the constraints, the attacker needs to
find the perturbation ∆Q first and obtainM∗Q by adding it toMQ .
After that, the attacker can computeM∗P = Ξ(M∗Q ) .
The above case of nonlinear constraints is special and may not
be scalable to various practical applications. Although there are
different types of nonlinear systems, they can be generalized using
piece-wise linear constraints by setting proper ranges and break-
points. We leave this as an open problem for future work.
6.2 Future Work
As we mentioned in Section 1, in this paper, we mainly investigate
the linear constraints of input measurements in CPSs and neural
network-based ML algorithms. In the future, research on ConAML
of nonlinear constraints and other general ML algorithms, such as
SVM, KNN will be proposed. We encourage related communities to
present different CPSs that require special constraints.
As summarized in [53], defense mechanisms like adversarial
re-training and adversarial detecting can increase the robustness
of neural networks and are likely to mitigate ConAML attacks.
However, most defenses in previous research target adversarial
examples in computer vision tasks. In future work, we will study
the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms in previous research and
evaluate their performance with adversarial examples generated by
ConAML. We will also investigate the defense mechanisms which
take advantage of the properties of physical systems directly, such
as the best deployment of sensors that will make the attackers’
constraint more stringent.
7 CONCLUSION
The potential vulnerability of ML applications in CPSs need to be
concerned. In this paper, we investigate the input constraints of
AML algorithms in CPSs. We analyze the difference of adversarial
examples between CPS and computational applications, like com-
puter vision, and give the formal threat model of AML in CPS. We
propose the best-effort search algorithms to effectively generate
the adversarial examples that meet the linear constraints. Finally, as
proofs of concept, we study the vulnerabilities of ML models used
in FDIA in power grids and anomaly detection in water treatment
systems. The evaluation results show that even with the constraints
imposed by the physical systems, our approach can still effectively
generate the adversarial examples that will significantly decrease
the detection accuracy of the defender’s ML models.
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A PROOF OF THEOREM ??
Proof. Due to the intrinsic property of the targeted system,
equation (3c) is naturally met, which indicates that there is always a
solution for the nonhomogeneous linear equations Φk×rX = Φ˜. Ac-
cordingly, we have Rank(Φk×r ) ≤ r . Moreover, if Rank(Φk×r ) = r ,
there will be one unique solution for equation (3c), which means
the measurements of compromised sensors are constant. The con-
stant measurements are contradictory to the purpose of deploy-
ing CPSs. In practical scenarios,M is changing over time, so that
Rank(Φk×r ) < r and the homogeneous linear equation Φk×rX = 0
will have infinite solutions. Therefore, the attacker can always build
a valid adversarial example that meets the constraints. □
B DEPENDENT MATRIX EXAMPLE
Suppose we have X = [x0,x1,x2,x3]T and Φ4×4 is the constraint
matrix, as shown below, we will have the XI = [x2,x3]T , XD =
[x0,x1]T and B =
[ 1
3 ,− 13 ;− 23 ,− 13
]
.
Φ4×4 =

1 2 1 1
2 1 0 1
3 3 1 2
1 −1 −1 0
 ⇔
[
x0
x1
]
=
[ 1
3 − 13
− 23 − 13
] [
x2
x3
]
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C POWER SYSTEM CASE STUDY
C.1 State Estimation and FDIA
We will give the mathematical description of state estimation and
how a false data injection attack (FDIA) can be launched. To be
clear, we will employ the widely used notations in related research
publications to denote the variables; the related explanation will
also be given to avoid confusion.
In general, the AC power flow measurement state estimation
model can be represented as follow:
z = h(x) + e (9)
where h is a function of x, x is the state variables, z is the mea-
surements, and e is the measurement errors. The task of state esti-
mation is to find an estimated xˆ that best fits z of (9). In practical
application, a DC measurement model is also used to decrease the
process time and (9) can then be represented as follow:
z = Hx + e (10)
where Hm×n is a matrix that determined by the topology, physical
parameters and configurations of the power grid.
Typically, if a weighted least squares estimation scheme is used,
the system state variable vector xˆ can be obtained through (11):
xˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWz (11)
whereW is the covariance matrix of the variances of meter errors.
Due to possible meter instability and cyber attacks, bad measure-
ments may be introduced to the measurement vector z. To solve
this, various bad measurement detection methods are proposed
[35]. One commonly used detection approach is to calculate the
measurement residual between the raw measurement z and derived
measurements Hxˆ. If the L2-norm ∥z −Hxˆ∥ > τ , where τ is a
threshold selected according to the false alarm rate, the measure-
ment z will be considered as a bad measurement.
In 2011, Liu et al. proposed the false data injection attack (FDIA)
that can bypass the detection scheme described above and pollute
the result of state estimation [33]. FDIA assumes that the attacker
knows the topology and configuration information H of the power
system. Let za = z+a denote the compromised measurement vector
that is observed by the state estimation, where a is the malicious
data added by the attacker. Thereafter, let xˆbad = xˆ + c denote
the polluted state that is estimated by za, where c represents the
estimation error brought by the attack. Liu et al. demonstrated
that, as long as the attacker builds the injection vector a = Hc, the
polluted measurements za will not be detected by the measurement
residual scheme.
Proof. If the original measurements z can pass the detection,
the residual ∥z −Hxˆ∥ ≤ τ . Through (12) from [33], we learn that
the measurement residual will be the same when a = Hc. Therefore,
the craftedmeasurements from the attackerwill not be detected. □
∥za −Hxˆbad ∥ = ∥z + a −H(xˆ + c)∥ (12a)
= ∥z −Hxˆ + (a −Hc)∥ (12b)
= ∥z −Hxˆ∥ ≤ τ (12c)
Besides, [33] also provided the approach to effectively find vector
a that will meet the attack requirement. Let P = H(HTH)−1HT
and matrix B = P − I. In order to have a = Hc, a needs to be a
solution of the homogeneous equation BX = 0, as shown in (13).
a = Hc ⇔ Pa = PHc⇔ Pa = Hc⇔ Pa = a (13a)
⇔ Pa − a = 0⇔ (P − I)a = 0 (13b)
⇔ Ba = 0 (13c)
Another problem of generating a is when will (13c) have a so-
lution. Liu et al. prove that, suppose the attacker compromises k
meters, as long as k > m − n, there always exists non-zero attack
vector a = Hc. We refer the readers to [33] for the detailed proof.
C.2 Experiment Implementation
We utilize the MATPOWER [55] library to derive the H matrix of
the system and generate the power flow measurement data that
follows Gaussian distribution. We also implement the FDIA using
MATLAB. The perturbation we injected to generate false data fol-
lows a Gaussian distribution.Wemake two datasets for the defender
and the attacker respectively. For each dataset, there are around
25,000 records with half records are polluted with FDIA. We label
the normal records as 0 and attack records as 1 and use one-hot
encoding for the labels.
We investigate the scenarios that there are 10, 13, and 15 mea-
surements being compromised by the attacker, with the randomly
generated compromised index vector C and corresponding con-
straint matrix Φ (BC in (13)). We generate 1,000 false records in
each test datasets.
After that, we train two deep learning models based on the
training datasets accordingly, with 75% records in the dataset used
for training and 25% for testing. We use simple fully connected
neural networks as the ML models and the model structures are
shown in Table 6. Both the models are trained with a 0.0001 leaning
rate, 512 batch size, and a mean squared error loss function. The
deep learning models are implemented using Tensorflow and the
Keras library and are trained on a Windows 10 machine with an
Intel i7 CPU. The training process is around 1 minutes for each
model.
Table 6: Model Structure - FDIA
Layer f f ′
0 46 Input 46 Input
1 32 Dense ReLu 30 Dense ReLu
2 48 Dense ReLu 40 Dense ReLu
3 56 Dense ReLu 30 Dense ReLu
4 48 Dense ReLu Dropout 0.25
5 32 Dense ReLu 20 Dense ReLu
6 Dropout 0.25 Dropout 0.25
7 16 Dense ReLu 2 Dense Softmax
8 Dropout 0.25 -
9 2 Dense Softmax -
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D WATER TREATMENT CASE STUDY
D.1 SWaT Measurement Constraints
We examined the user manual of the SWaT system and check the
structure of the water pipelines. We found some FIT measure-
ments in SWaT should always follow inequality constraints when
the whole system is working steadily. Based on the component
names described in [15], the constraints can be represented as (14),
where ϵ1 and ϵ2 are the allowed measurement errors. We utilized
the double value of the maximum difference of the corresponding
measurements in the SWaT dataset to estimate ϵ1 and ϵ2, and we
had ϵ1 = 0.0403 and ϵ2 = 0.153.
FIT301 ≤ FIT201 (14a)
∥FIT401 − FIT501∥ ≤ ϵ1 (14b)
∥(FIT502 + FIT503) − (FIT501 + FIT504)∥ ≤ ϵ2 (14c)
Based on (4), we can represent (14) as follow. AndMC is the vec-
tor of measurements of FIT201, FIT301, FIT401, FIT501, FIT502,
FIT503 and FIT504 accordingly.
Φ5×7 =

−1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 1 1 −1
0 0 0 1 −1 −1 1

Φ˜ =

0
0.0403
0.0403
0.153
0.153

We consider three scenarios that there are 2, 5, and 7 FIT mea-
surements being compromised by the attacker, and the compro-
mised sensors are {FIT201, FIT301}, {FIT401, FIT501, FIT502, FIT503, FIT504},
and all the seven FIT sensors respectively. The constraint matrix
for each scenario can be derived from the corresponding rows of
the Φ5×7 matrix.
D.2 Experimental Implementation
In the Swat dataset, we extracted the normal records which were
sampled when the whole system was working steadily. We also
removed all the actuators’ features. Here, we denote the extracted
records as De . After that, we randomly picked out three 1,000
records from De as the three test datasets Dtests and added Gauss-
ian noise to the compromised measurements of each record in each
dataset. We checked the polluted record every time when a noise
vector was added to ensure all the records in Dtests meet the in-
equality constraints. Here, we denote the rest records of De as
Dtrain which contains 120,093 records with each record having 25
features in our implementation. To generate the training dataset
Ddef end for the defender, we randomly selected half of the records
in Dtrain and added random noise that follows a normal distribu-
tion. The polluted records in Ddef end are labeled with 1 and the
rest with 0. In the same way, we generate Dattack for the attacker
to train his/her ML model. We allow the records in Dtrain and
Ddef end with label 1 to violate the constraints since the ML models
are also expected to detect the obviously anomalous measurements.
We utilize Ddef end and Dattack to train the ML models fθ and
f ′θ ′ for the defender and attacker respectively. Again, 75% records
in the both datasets were used for training the 25% records for
Table 7: Model Structure - Water Treatment
Layer f f ′
0 25 Input 25 Input
1 20 Dense ReLu 24 Dense ReLu
2 40 Dense ReLu 32 Dense ReLu
3 30 Dense ReLu 32 Dense ReLu
4 Dropout 0.25 16 Dense ReLu
5 20 Dense ReLu 2 Dense Softmax
6 Dropout 0.25 -
7 2 Dense Softmax -
testing during the training process. Similar to FDIA experiment,
we utilize fully connected neural networks and the structures are
shown in Table 7. Through parameter tuning, model fθ and f ′θ ′
achieves 97.2% and 96.7% accuracy respectively.
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